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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Virgin Islands legislature has enacted a business 
licensing scheme pursuant to which every person "wishing 
to engage in any business, occupation, profession or trade" 
listed in the statute is required to obtain a license and pay 
an annual license fee. V.I. Code. Ann. tit. 27, § 301(a) 
(1997). One of the listings is "Attorney," for which the 
annual fee is $500. See id. § 302. The question presented in 
this appeal is whether the license fee must be paid by 
attorneys whose sole practice (and income) is as law firm 
employees. The obligation of law firm partners and of sole 
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practitioners to obtain a license and pay the fee is 
unquestioned. 
 
The plaintiffs are four attorneys who are members of the 
Virgin Islands Bar, a law firm, and the Virgin Islands Bar 
Association (collectively, "the plaintiffs"). In September 
1992, defendant Clement Magras, Commissioner of the 
Virgin Islands Department of Licensing and Consumer 
Affairs ("Commissioner"), informed the plaintiffs that they 
were required to obtain a business license from his 
department in order to practice law in the Virgin Islands. 
After some correspondence which failed to resolve the 
matter, the plaintiffs brought suit in the Territorial Court of 
the Virgin Islands. That court issued an injunction against 
collection of the fees; the Appellate Division of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands affirmed. The Territorial and 
District Courts concluded that, under the statutory 
scheme, the obligation to obtain a license runs only to the 
partners of the firm for which the non-owner attorneys 
work. The appellate panel grounded this interpretation on 
its reading of the statutory language; on the 
Commissioner's historical interpretation of the statute, to 
which it apparently gave some deference; and on its belief 
that application of the licensing provisions to non-owner 
attorneys might, in view of the sanctions available to the 
Commissioner for non-payment of the license fees, 
somehow trench upon the power of the courts to regulate 
the practice of law. 
 
Finding the statutory language quite clear and 
susceptible to no interpretation other than that all 
attorneys, whether or not employed by others, are subject 
to the license requirement and fee, we reverse. We therefore 
need not reach the administrative interpretation issue. We 
also summarily reject the plaintiffs' argument that the 
application of the licensing scheme to all attorneys would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Further, given the 
concession by the Commissioner that he would not employ 
his power under the licensing scheme to interfere with the 
judiciary's role in regulating the professional conduct and 
competence of attorneys, and given the absence of any 
pending or threatened action that might involve such 
interference, we have little difficulty with the contention 
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that the licensing scheme infringes the power of the courts 
to regulate the bar. In the course of discussing the power 
of the courts to regulate the bar, we hold, for the first time, 
that the principle of separation of powers applies to the 
coordinate branches of the Virgin Islands government. 
 
I. THE LICENSING STATUTE 
 
Consideration of the contentions of the parties requires 
that we set forth the relevant text of §§ 301 and 302. It is 
as follows: 
 
§ 301. Licenses required; application forms; 
qualifications and limitations 
 
 (a) Every person or association wishing to engage in 
any business, occupation, profession, or trade listed in 
section 302 of this chapter, as a condition precedent to 
engaging in any such business, occupation, profession, 
or trade, shall apply in writing to and obtain from the 
Commissioner of Licensing and Consumer Affairs 
(referred to as the "Commissioner" in the remainder of 
this chapter) a license to engage in or to conduct such 
business, occupation, profession or trade. 
 
 (b) Applications for licenses under this chapter shall 
be made on forms prescribed and furnished by the 
Commissioner. As part of or in connection with any 
application the applicant shall furnish information 
concerning his identify, personal history, experience, 
business record, purposes, record of any conviction of 
any offense which is a felony or crime involving moral 
turpitude in the jurisdiction where the offense 
occurred, and any other pertinent facts that the 
Commissioner may reasonably require. 
 
 In the case of corporations or partnerships the 
preceding requirements shall be applicable to all of the 
shareholders or partners. . . . 
 
 (c) If the applicant is a partnership or a corporation, 
the application shall designate each member, officer, or 
employee who will exercise the powers to be conferred 
by the license upon such partnership or corporation. 
The Commissioner may require any such member, 
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officer or employee to furnish him with the information 
required of applicants under subsection (b) of this 
section. 
 
. . . . 
 
§ 302. Same; business, occupations, professions and 
trades covered; fees 
 
 (a) The following annual license fees are made 
applicable to and shall be levied upon all persons and 
associations engaged in the designated businesses, 
occupations, professions and trades in the Virgin 
Islands of the United States: 
 
. . . 
 
Attorney [$] 500   
 
. . . . 
 
We will refer to these provisions throughout our 
discussion. We also attach the schedule contained in § 302 
as an appendix. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY; THE APPELLATE PANEL 
OPINION 
 
In September 1992, the Commissioner issued letters to 
the plaintiffs informing them that they were required to 
obtain business licenses pursuant to the Virgin Islands 
licensing statute. The plaintiffs responded that, as 
employees of law firms whose partners or shareholders 
were properly licensed, there was no requirement that they 
be licensed individually. The plaintiffs requested a hearing. 
More correspondence followed, culminating in the 
Commissioner's threats to publish the names of the 
plaintiffs not in compliance with the licensing statute and 
to refer the matter for possible criminal prosecution. 
 
The plaintiffs brought suit in the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands. The Territorial Court issued a permanent 
injunction enjoining the Commissioner from collecting 
license fees from non-owner attorneys who work at law 
firms. The Commissioner appealed. 
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In affirming the order of the Territorial Court, the 
Appellate Division of the District Court proceeded from a 
rendering of the statute that highlighted certain words and 
phrases. In § 301(a), the appellate panel underscored 
"[e]very person or association." In § 301(b), it stressed the 
provision that "[i]n the case of corporations or partnerships 
the preceding requirements shall be applicable to all of the 
shareholders or partners." And, in § 301(c), it highlighted 
the following sentence: 
 
If the applicant is a partnership or a corporation, the 
application shall designate each member, officer, or 
employee who will exercise the powers to be conferred 
by the license upon the partnership or corporation. 
 
(emphasis added by Appellate Division). 
 
The panel then stated: 
 
The only reasonable, logical and consistent inference 
we draw from the highlighted words is that the license 
is to be granted to the partnership or corporation itself, 
not to "each member, officer or employee who will 
exercise the powers of the license." 
 
The panel then turned to the interpretation given the 
statute by the administrative agency charged with its 
enforcement. The panel looked to the form distributed by 
the Commissioner to all license applicants, which, inter 
alia, requests the applicant to check off: 
 
"TYPE OF ORGANIZATION" it is: a sole proprietorship, 
reflecting the word "person" used in subsections 301(a) 
& (b) and 302(a); or a corporation, a partnership, a 
joint venture, reflecting the word "association" in those 
same subsections. 
 
In the Appellate Division's view: 
 
The only mention of employee is the application's 
request for the total estimated number of employees; it 
does not require the applicant to identify these 
employees by listing their names and/or positions. 
None of the remaining requirements on the application 
form have any relevance to the question whether 
separate license fees can be taxed to attorney- 
employees of private law firms. 
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The court also noted that, prior to Commissioner 
Magras's September 1992 letters, the Commission had not 
required an attorney to apply for and pay for a separate 
business license unless the attorney had an ownership 
interest in the law partnership or corporation that 
employed him or her. It also pointed out that, although 
"Travel Ticket Agent" is listed as an occupation required to 
obtain a license, the department does not require a travel 
agent working as an employee of a travel agency to pay a 
separate license fee. The court analogized the non-owner 
attorney in a law firm to an employee of a travel agency and 
concluded that the two should be treated similarly. The 
court opined that a non-owner attorney in a law firm is not 
conducting business. Rather, the court reasoned, a non- 
owner attorney is working on behalf of the firm, which is 
conducting business. 
 
Finally, the court cautioned that the provisions of the 
licensing scheme allowing the Commissioner to base 
licensing decisions on the moral character or misconduct of 
the licensee violated the principle of separation of powers. 
Because such provisions effectively regulated attorneys in 
the Virgin Islands, the court reasoned, they impermissibly 
allowed the Commissioner, at least potentially, to operate in 
areas under the exclusive control of the judiciary. 
 
The plaintiffs' arguments before us have essentially 
tracked the appellate division's position. In addition, they 
contend that applying the licensing scheme to non-owner 
attorneys would deny such attorneys equal protection of 
the laws. That is so, they submit, because these attorneys 
would be required to pay the licensing fee while other, 
allegedly similarly situated employees would not be so 
required. 
 
The Commissioner appeals from the order of the 
appellate division. The Commissioner argues that the plain 
language can be interpreted only to mean that the licensing 
requirements apply to all attorneys, and, in the alternative, 
that any ambiguity in the statute should be resolved in 
favor of the agency charged with its interpretation, which, 
in this case, determined that the statute applies to all 
attorneys. The Territorial Court had original jurisdiction 
pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 76(a) (Supp. 1994). The 
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Appellate Division had jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
Territorial Court pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33 
(Supp. 1994). We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the 
final order of the appellate division pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613a(c). 
 
We review the grant of a permanent injunction for abuse 
of discretion. See International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 
UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 94-95 (3d Cir. 
1987). "An abuse of discretion exists where the district 
court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneousfinding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper 
application of law to fact." Id. at 95. Statutory construction 
is a legal question, over which we exercise plenary review. 
See Air Courier Conference of America/Int'l Comm. v. United 
States Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1217 & n.3 (3d Cir. 
1992). Therefore, in the context of the present appeal, if, 
after our plenary review, we conclude that the Territorial 
Court erred as a matter of law in interpreting the licensing 
statute, we may say that it did not act within its discretion 




A. Professional Licensing Schemes in General 
 
Licensing schemes similar to that at issue here are not 
uncommon. More often than not, these schemes, by their 
very terms, apply to attorneys. Their form varies: some 
operate statewide, others are local enactments; some 
merely generate revenue by way of fees, others include 
regulatory provisions that govern conduct. Not surprisingly, 
there is a substantial body of state law governing such 
arrangements. See David B. Sweet, Annotation, Validity of 
State or Municipal Tax or License Fee Upon Occupation of 
Practicing Law, 50 A.L.R. 4th 467 (1986); 9 Beth A. Buday 
& Julie Rozwadowski, McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations §§ 26.128, 26.130 (3d ed. 1995). Often, 
attorneys subject to these schemes will challenge them on 
numerous grounds, basing their challenges on federal and 
state constitutional or statutory law. Although we have 
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undertaken no systematic study, our research indicates 
that, for the most part, these arrangements are largely 
unobjectionable and are ordinarily approved by state 
courts. 
 
Without attempting our own synthesis of the case law, we 
offer some representative examples of cases addressing 
such schemes. In Sterling v. City of Philadelphia, 106 A.2d 
793 (Pa. 1954), an oft-cited case, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania upheld a city ordinance that established a 
mercantile tax that applied to attorneys. In so doing, the 
court reasoned that a pure revenue-raising measure does 
not infringe on the power of the state courts to regulate 
attorneys because such a measure does not affect the 
rights and duties of an attorney in carrying out his 
profession. See id. at 796-98. It stated further that "the 
privilege of practicing law carries with it no exemption from 
the duties of citizenship, including the sharing with all 
others the expense of government, national, state and 
municipal." Id. at 796. Courts reaching a similar conclusion 
include Kradolfer v. Smith, 805 P.2d 1266 (Mont. 1990), 
Mire v. City of Lake Charles, 540 So.2d 950 (La. 1989), 
Gleason v. City Council of Augusta, 251 S.E.2d 536 (Ga. 
1979), and Lublin v. Brown, 362 A.2d 769 (Conn. 1975). 
 
Courts have taken a different view of measures that 
include regulatory provisions placing conditions on the 
practice of law. For example, in Sexton v. City of Jonesboro, 
481 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1997), the Supreme Court of Georgia 
invalidated a municipal ordinance that required, as a 
precondition to engaging in the practice of law, the payment 
of a fee. Although it recognized the right of local 
governments to tax attorneys, the court held that this 
particular measure was regulatory and therefore infringed 
on the exclusive power of the courts to regulate attorneys. 
See id. at 820. At least one court has even invalidated a 
measure that was non-regulatory and only revenue-raising. 
In Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973), the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a statute that 
diverted registration fees collected statewide from attorneys 
to general treasury funds improperly infringed on the 
constitutionally provided, exclusive power of the courts to 
regulate attorneys. See id. at 279-82. 
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Sexton and Sharood notwithstanding, it is the rare case 
in which licensing schemes are found infirm. See generally, 
Sweet, supra §§ 11-13. On the contrary, such schemes are 
routinely upheld, even in the face of challenges based on 
state constitutional law. 
 
B. Plain Language 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the relevant 
language of the Virgin Islands statute. The general standard 
for statutory interpretation is well known and not in 
dispute here. The "first step in interpreting a statute is to 
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute 
in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. 
Ct. 843, 846 (1997). If so, our inquiry is at an end. See id. 
Of course, interpretation of a statute involves the 
examination of the statute as a whole. See id. In that sense, 
we must endeavor to give each word of the statute operative 
effect. See Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., ___ U.S. 
___, 117 S. Ct. 661, 664 (1997). In other words, "[s]tatutory 
construction `is a holistic endeavor.' " United States Nat'l 
Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. 
Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993) (quoting United Savings Ass'n of Tex. 
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
371 (1988)). 
 
In our view, the language of the statute in dispute is 
entirely plain. Section 301 requires "[e]very person or 
association wishing to engage in any business, occupation, 
profession, or trade listed in section 302" to obtain a license 
to do so. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 27, § 301(a) (1997) (emphasis 
added). Section 302 states that the license fee requirement 
is "made applicable to and shall be levied upon all persons 
and associations engaged in the designated businesses, 
occupations, professions and trades." Id. § 302 (emphasis 
added). "Attorney" is listed in § 302. See id. Therefore, the 
plain language of the statute unambiguously states that 
every individual who wishes to practice as an attorney must 
obtain a license.1 We believe the case to be that simple. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statute exempts attorneys who work for the government. See V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 27, § 306 (1997). We have earlier held that the exemption 
is valid and does not violate the principle of equal protection. See Hollar 
v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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We also note that the statute distinguishes between 
instances in which an entity is potentially subject to a 
license and those in which individuals, including 
employees, are potentially subject to a license (depending 
on whether the entity or individual is "engaged in" the listed 
activity). For example, because "[b]aby sitting service" is 
listed in § 302 as an entity, i.e., the relevant licensee is the 
"service" as an entity, only the service itself, and not the 
employees of the service, would be subject to the licensing 
requirement. By contrast, because "[a]ttorney" is listed in 
§ 302 as an individual, each individual attorney is subject 
to the licensing requirement, whether he or she is an 
employee or not. In certain circumstances, the statute also 
requires a license of both the entity and the employees. For 
example, § 302 requires a license of a "[b]arber shop" and 
of each "[b]arber," "[b]arber apprentice," and "[b]arber 
temporary." In short, the distinctions that the Virgin 
Islands legislature drew in § 302 strongly suggest that the 
legislature intended to require licenses of entities in some 
instances, of employees of entities in others, and of both 
entities and employees in still others.2  By employing the 
term "[a]ttorney," the legislature appears to have intended 
to license attorneys as individuals. 
 
The plaintiffs only response to the foregoing is to argue 
that this interpretation cannot be reconciled with the 
language of other provisions of the licensing statute. In 
particular, they submit that these other provisions 
(highlighted supra at part I) make it clear that in corporate 
or partnership settings, only the corporation or partnership, 
and not the employees, need obtain a license. Because non- 
owner attorneys in a law firm are mere employees, the 
plaintiffs reason that these other provisions exempt non- 
owner attorneys from the licensing requirements. We 
disagree. 
 
The plaintiffs point first to the second paragraph of 
§ 301(b), which governs the information a corporation or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is unclear whether the Commissioner has enforced the licensing 
statute against all the employees who may be subject to its 
requirements. At all events, a claim of impermissible selective 
enforcement has not been raised and we do not reach that issue. 
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partnership must submit with an application for a license. 
Under that paragraph, when a corporation or partnership 
applies for a license, "all of the shareholders or partners" 
must submit certain information along with the 
corporation's or partnership's application. Id. § 301(b). 
Because § 301(b) only requires information from 
"shareholders or partners," the plaintiffs submit that non- 
shareholders and non-partners are exempt from the 
licensing requirements altogether. The plaintiffs read too 
much into this provision. The second paragraph of § 301(b) 
governs, by its very terms, only the application of 
corporations or partnerships. It does not govern individual 
applications at all. 
 
We note that requiring non-shareholders and non- 
partners to submit information along with the corporation 
or partnership for whom they work would make little sense. 
Such individuals have no de jure say in the governance of 
the applicant corporation or partnership, so the licensing 
body should have no interest in non-shareholders or non- 
partners when determining whether to license a corporation 
or partnership qua corporation or partnership. Excluding 
non-shareholders and non-partners from the requirements 
of the second paragraph of § 301(b), then, is merely a 
recognition of the internal structures of corporations and 
partnerships. That exclusion says nothing about whether a 
non-shareholder or a non-partner need make his own 
application for a license. 
 
The plaintiffs, however, read § 301(c) as bolstering their 
argument as to the second paragraph of § 301(b). Section 
301(c) requires that a corporation or partnership"designate 
each member, officer, or employee who will exercise the 
powers to be conferred by the license upon such 
partnership or corporation." Id. § 301(c). Each designee may 
then be required to submit certain information along with 
the application of the corporation or partnership. See id. 
The plaintiffs contend that this language does not mean 
that the designated "member, officer, or employee" is 
subject to the licensing requirements. That may be so, but 
the argument does not "advance the ball" in this case. 
Nothing in § 301(c) states that "each member, officer, or 
employee" is not subject to the licensing requirements. 
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Moreover, like the second paragraph of § 301(b), § 301(c) 
only applies to applications of corporations or partnerships; 
it says nothing about applications of individual persons. 
And, again like the second paragraph of § 301(b), § 301(c) is 
merely a recognition of governance in corporations or 
partnerships. A designated "member, officer, or employee," 
by § 301(c)'s definition, will be exercising power within the 
corporation or partnership. Therefore, the licensing body 
may have some interest in that "member, officer, or 
employee" when considering whether to license the 
corporation or partnership. In short, the fact that the 
licensing body may require § 301(c) designees to submit 
certain information is simply inconclusive as to whether 




3. The plaintiffs also argue that our interpretation would render § 303(a) 
meaningless in certain circumstances. Section 303(a) requires that the 
licensing body forward applications for licenses to agencies in the 
Government of the Virgin Islands charged with historic preservation and 
environmental protection so that those agencies can examine the 
application for "construction and site acceptability." Id. § 303(a). Because 
it would make little sense to review the applications of non-owner 
attorneys with respect to "construction and site acceptability," the 
plaintiffs reason that non-owner attorneys are not subject to the 
licensing requirements. To the extent that this argument has any force, 
and we think it does not, it seems totally immaterial for it proves too 
much. By their reasoning, the licensing requirements would not apply to 
the numerous persons or associations, listed in§ 302, who would not 
necessarily construct a building nor even need a building in which to 
operate their business, engage in their occupation, practice their 
profession, or carry out their trade. If the plaintiffs are correct in their 
argument about § 303(a), then the licensing requirements would apply to 
none of these businesses, occupations, professions, or trades. Section 
303(a) does not exempt a person or association from the licensing 
requirements simply because he, she, or it is not concerned with the 
construction or siting of a building. 
 
The plaintiffs further argue that § 303b(a) supports their position. 
Section 303b(a) requires that "[a]ny entity licensed pursuant to this 
chapter shall notify the Employment Security Agency, Virgin Islands 
Department of Labor, of its intent to fill an existing position, now vacant 
or soon to become vacant, or a new previously unfilled position." Id. 
§ 303b(a). Because non-owner attorneys are in no position to hire 
 
                                13 
The plaintiffs further claim that our reading of the statute 
would produce, as they describe it, the absurd result that 
every individual employee in every venture in the Virgin 
Islands would be subject to the licensing requirements. We 
believe the plaintiffs incorrectly characterize our reading of 
the statute. As we have already noted, the statute, by its 
very terms, makes clear that not all employees are subject 
to the licensing requirements. Further, whether an 
individual is subject to the licensing requirement depends 
on whether the individual is "engaged in the designated 
business[ ], occupation[ ], profession[ ] and trade[ ]." Id. 
§ 302 (emphasis added). The issue here, then, is whether 
the non-owner attorneys are "engaged in" the profession of 
"[a]ttorney," and it is clear beyond doubt that the non- 
owner attorneys are "engaged in" in the profession of 
"[a]ttorney." 
 
As practicing attorneys in the Virgin Islands, the 
plaintiffs must be active members of the Virgin Islands bar. 
See V.I. Terr. Ct. R. 305(b). As active members of the Virgin 
Islands bar, the plaintiffs must be engaged in the practice 
of law. See id. at 306(a). Therefore, the fact that the 
plaintiffs are practicing attorneys leads ineluctably to the 
conclusion that they are engaged in being attorneys. See 
Mayor & Council of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157 A.2d 789, 793 
(De. 1960) (classifying employee physicians as carrying out 
the medical profession); Brinton v. City of Jonesboro, 320 
S.W.2d 272, 273 (Ark. 1959) (classifying employee attorneys 
as carrying out the legal profession).4  This conclusion is not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
anyone, the plaintiffs reason that non-owner attorneys must not be 
subject to the licensing requirements. This argument is also flawed. 
First, by its very terms, § 303b(a) only applies to entities; it does not 
apply to individual persons. Second, the argument similarly proves too 
much. By the reasoning of the plaintiffs, § 303b(a) would exempt 
numerous businesses, occupations, professions, and trades listed in 
§ 302 from the licensing requirements. Just because these businesses, 
occupations, professions, or trades -- by their very nature -- will not be 
hiring any employees does not mean that § 303b(a) exempts them from 
the licensing requirements. If § 303b(a) did work such exemptions, then 
these businesses, occupations, professions, and trades would be read 
out of § 302. 
 
4. The plaintiffs point to language in § 306, the exemption for 
government attorneys, see supra note 1, for further support of their 
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affected by the fact that the attorneys at issue in this case 
are non-owner attorneys in a law firm.5  Further, that non- 
owner attorneys at law firms may be "engaged in" the 
profession of "[a]ttorney" does not determine whether other 
employees, in other fields, are "engaged in" a listed 
business, occupation, profession, or trade.6 
 
In sum, the plain language of the statute renders it 
applicable to non-owner attorneys employed by law firms.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
position. They note that the section will not apply if the exempted 
individual is "engaged in the conduct of business pursuits for profit." V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 27, § 306 (1997). According to the plaintiffs, such 
language implies that the licensing scheme applies only to the business 
entity and not to employees, because it is the business entity that is 
seeking the profits. We believe such language implies exactly the 
opposite. If the licensing scheme applied only to business entities and 
not to employees, there would be no need for the exemption in the first 
place; government attorneys are mere employees. 
 
5. We caution that our holding extends only to those non-owner 
attorneys of law firms who work in the Virgin Islands and have been 
admitted to the Virgin Islands bar to practice before the local courts by 
the regular admission rules. Our holding does not address those 
attorneys who have been admitted to the Virgin Islands bar pro hac vice 
or by the special admission rules, who do not ordinarily work in the 
Virgin Islands, or who have been admitted in the Virgin Islands only to 
practice before the District Court of the Virgin Islands. We do not reach 
the question whether such attorneys are "engaged in" being attorneys in 
the Virgin Islands. 
 
6. The kernel of Judge Weis' argument is that, while the statute, 
particularly § 302(b), seemingly covers virtually everyone in the work 
force, the (inconsistent) administration of the statute negates that view, 
and counsels that employees are simply not covered. As we have noted 
above, see supra, note 2, the matter of selective enforcement is not 
before us. We do note, however, that Judge Weis reads too much into the 
catch-all provision. As we understand the reference to "[a]ny person or 
association engaged in a business, occupation, profession, or trade" not 
listed or not covered by any other provision of this Code, who is to 
obtain an annual license at a fee of $100, it deals with a new occupation 
that did not previously exist (e.g. "Internet Counsultant"), or an 
occupation not at all mentioned in § 302(a), either on its own, or as part 
of an entity. 
 
7. Our conclusion about the plain language of the statute effectively 
disposes of the argument, advanced by the Commissioner, that we must 
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C. Separation of Powers 
 
The plaintiffs contend that applying the licensing 
requirements to them would violate the principle of 
separation of powers. They argue that the judicial branch of 
the Virgin Islands enjoys exclusive control over the 
regulation of the practice of law in the Virgin Islands. 
Because the licensing scheme is itself a form of regulatory 
control, the plaintiffs continue, imposing that scheme on 
attorneys would allow executive agencies to regulate 
attorneys and thereby to encroach on the judiciary's 
domain. Of particular concern to the plaintiffs are those 
provisions of the licensing statute that allow executive 
agencies to deny a license to or revoke a license from those 
whose moral character or misconduct renders them unfit to 
engage in business in the Virgin Islands, see V.I. Code 
Ann., tit. 27 § 304(a)(2) (1997), or those who allow improper 
or wrongful behavior on their business premises, see id. 
§ 304(a)(3). The plaintiffs also profess concern about those 
provisions that allow the executive agencies to enjoin a 
person from engaging in business without a license. See id. 
§§ 307(c), 307a(b). The plaintiffs' concerns (and their claims) 
must, however, be deemed tempered by the Commissioner's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
give deference to the interpretation given the statute by the agencies 
charged with enforcing it. This argument is drawn from Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Assuming without so holding that the principles of Chevron apply to the 
relationship of the executive agencies and the courts in the Virgin 
Islands, the well-known two-part test enunciated in Chevron would 
dictate that our inquiry here begins and ends with the first part of the 
test, whether the statute is ambiguous. Because the statute here is 
clear, there is no need to move to the second part of the test, whether 
the agency has permissibly construed the statute. Similarly, our 
conclusion about the plain language effectively disposes of the argument, 
advanced by the plaintiffs, that ambiguous statutory language dealing 
with licensing schemes is to be interpreted against the government. 
Assuming without so holding that this is a correct proposition of law, 
that proposition would have no place in this case because, as we have 
discussed, the language of the statute is not ambiguous. 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that our reading of the licensing statute 
would render the licensing scheme in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. We have considered that contention and find it utterly baseless. 
We therefore reject it summarily. 
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explicit disclaimer, in this court, of authority to interfere 
with the court's control over lawyers: "At no time has the 
[Commissioner] disagreed with the power of the court to 
regulate the professional conduct of attorneys." Appellant's 
Reply Brief at 4. Moreover, the Commissioner acknowledges 
that "the court licenses to regulate professional conduct 
and competence." Id. There is no action before the court -- 
or apparently even contemplated by the Commissioner -- to 
disbar a delinquent attorney or to regulate his professional 
practice, judgment, or activity. Thus the potentional 
infringement is more modest than was originally supposed. 
The plaintiffs have nonetheless mounted a separation of 
powers-based challenge to the statute even insofar as it 
requires licensure, and hence we must address the issue.8 
 
At the threshold, we hold that the doctrine of separation 
of powers applies with respect to the coordinate branches of 
government in the Virgin Islands. The Organic Act of the 
Virgin Islands created three branches of government in the 
Virgin Islands. See 48 U.S.C. § 1571 (legislative branch); id. 
§ 1591 (executive branch); id. § 1611 (judicial branch). 
Congress therefore implicitly incorporated the principle of 
separation of powers into the law of the territory. See 
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 
189, 199-202 (1928). 
 
In Springer, the Supreme Court examined the structure 
of government in the Philippines, then a territory of the 
United States. The Court noted that Congress, in enacting 
the Philippine Organic Act, created three branches of 
government. See id. at 201. In so doing, the Court 
continued, Congress incorporated the principle of 
separation of powers into Philippine law. It stated that "as 
a general rule inherent in the American constitutional 
system . . . unless otherwise expressly provided or 
incidental to the powers conferred, the Legislature cannot 
exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive 
cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Appellees Brief at 15 et seq. 
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judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative 
power." Id. at 201-02.9 
 
Because the issue before us is whether the licensing 
scheme infringes on judicial power, we must first discuss 
the scope of the relevant judicial power. The Organic Act, as 
amended in 1984, provides that "[t]he rules governing the 
practice and procedure of the courts established by local 
law and those prescribing the qualifications and duties of 
the judges and officers thereof . . . shall be governed by 
local law or the rules promulgated by those courts." 48 
U.S.C. § 1611(c) (emphasis added). It is thus clear from the 
Organic Act itself that local law -- enacted by the Virgin 
Islands legislature -- may have some role to play in the 
regulation of attorneys (officers of the court). Put differently, 
the Organic Act envisions the possibility of the sharing of 
power over the regulation of attorneys between the Virgin 
Islands courts and the Virgin Islands legislature, at least to 
the extent of imposing a license fee. The possibility of that 
sharing itself disposes of the argument that the application 
of the licensing scheme to attorneys violates the principle of 
separation of powers. 
 
The plaintiffs and the appellate division, however, point 
to provisions of the Virgin Islands Code that, they contend, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In addition to Springer, we draw support for our conclusion from two 
other lines of authority. The first is our own jurisprudence. We have 
often assumed, without squarely holding, that the doctrine of separation 
of powers applies with respect to the coordinate branches of government 
in the Virgin Islands. See, e.g., Territorial Ct. of the Virgin Islands v. 
Richards, 847 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1988); Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34, 37 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986); Dennis v. Luis, 
741 F.2d 628, 631-38 (3d Cir. 1984); Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 239- 
40 (3d Cir. 1980). The second is the jurisprudence of the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands and the Territorial Court, which have routinely 
applied the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e.g., Bryan v. Liburd, 
CIV. No. 711/96, 1996 WL 785997, at *2 (Terr. Ct. V.I. Dec. 30, 1996); 
Dawsey v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 931 F. Supp. 397, 401 
(D.V.I.), aff 'd, 106 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 65 U.S.L.W. 
3820 (U.S. June 16, 1997) (No. 96-1803); Luis v. Dennis, 576 F. Supp. 
733, 734 (D.V.I. 1983), vacated by 751 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Municipality of St. Thomas & St. John v. Gordon, 78 F. Supp. 440, 442- 
44 (D.V.I. 1948). 
 
                                18 
provide the judiciary with exclusive control over the 
regulation of attorneys in the Virgin Islands. The first 
provision is V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 441 (1967 & Supp. 
1994). Section 441 grants jurisdiction over the regulation of 
attorneys in the Virgin Islands to the district court. But, 
even if § 441 retains any vitality after the passage of 48 
U.S.C. § 1611(b) and V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 76(a) (Supp. 
1994), see In re Application of Moorhead, 27 V.I. 74, 80-84 
(V.I. Terr. Ct. 1992) (holding that § 1611(b) and § 76(a) shift 
control over the regulation of attorneys in the Virgin Islands 
from the district court to the Territorial Court), it would not 
provide support for the contentions of the plaintiffs. Section 
441 does not, by its terms or otherwise, vest exclusive 
control over the regulation of attorneys in the judiciary. 
Moreover, nothing in Moorhead or § 76(a), to which the 
plaintiffs also point, alters the possibility of the sharing of 
power arrangement embodied in § 1611(c). 
 
The plaintiffs also seek support for their argument from 
the inherent power of courts to control the admission of 
attorneys to practice before them. Although the inherent 
power of the courts to regulate attorneys is well 
established, see, e.g., Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
9, 13 (1857), it is also well established that legislatures 
have the power to cabin inherent power in courts of their 
own creation. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 
47 (1991); see also Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 13-14. 
Although not directly on point, Secombe and Chambers 
provide some instruction. Congress allowed for the creation 
of local Virgin Islands courts; it can certainly restrict their 
power. In this case, Congress did so by including in 
§ 1611(c) the possibility of a sharing arrangement. 
 
We have held that the exercise of legislative power in this 
regard is at least partially circumscribed. In Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), we 
described three categories of inherent powers: (1) 
irreducible powers derived from Article III over which courts 
have absolute command; (2) essential powers that Congress 
may regulate but not abrogate or render practically 
inoperative; and (3) useful powers that exist only in the 
absence of legislative directive to the contrary. See id. at 
562-64. It cannot seriously be said, however, that the 
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power to regulate attorneys is one of the irreducible powers 
of a court completely immune from legislative interference. 
As we explained in Eash, such powers exist in "an 
extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so 
fundamental to the essence of an autonomous court as a 
constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute 
command within this sphere is really to render practically 
meaningless the terms `court' and `judicial power.' " Eash, 
757 F.2d at 562. 
 
But even assuming that the power to regulate attorneys 
is essential to the functioning of a court, the interference 
here is minimal and in no way renders inoperative that 
power. Congress has not, by § 1611(c), abrogated the power 
to regulate attorneys; it has merely allowed for the division 
of that power. At all events, there can be no dispute that 
attorneys, like other citizens, are subject to criminal and 
administrative sanctions as well as the usual collection 
remedies for failure to pay taxes or licensing fees. 
Enforcement of such obligations does not impair the 
judiciary's supervision of the Bar. See, e.g., Sterling v. City 
of Philadelphia, 106 A.2d 793, 796-97 (Pa. 1954). 
 
Our discussion is not inconsistent with the state court 
cases that have invalidated similar licensing schemes 
because such schemes infringe on the power of the courts 
to regulate attorneys. Such cases are grounded on the 
exclusive control over the regulation of attorneys the 
particular state had vested in its judiciary. We mention one 
case as an example. In Harlen v. City of Helena, 676 P.2d 
191 (Mont. 1984), the Supreme Court of Montana 
invalidated a city ordinance requiring a fee of all persons or 
entities carrying out business in the city. See id. at 192. 
Vital to the court was the fact that it had exclusive 
authority, pursuant to the state constitution, to promulgate 
rules governing attorneys. See id. at 193. 
 
In sum, the principle of separation of powers is not 
violated by the application of the Virgin Islands licensing 
scheme to attorneys. The order of the appellate division 
affirming the order of the Territorial Court issuing a 
permanent injunction against enforcement of the licensing 
statute against non-owner attorneys will be reversed. 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The Territorial Court and the Appellate Division of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands read the licensing 
provisions as a whole and construed them to be generally 
directed to business entities, partnerships, and 
corporations, rather than to individual employees. I agree 
and would affirm. 
 
The statute says in very broad terms that "[e]very person 
or association wishing to engage in any business, 
occupation, profession, or trade listed in section 302" must 
obtain a license. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 27, § 301(a) (1997). In 
turn, section 302 lists several hundred occupations, 
services, professions, and callings, including such diverse 
classifications as itinerant vendors, judo instructors, 
machine shops (but not machinists), masonry contractors 
(but not masons), master plumbers, modeling agencies (but 
not models), pharmacies (but not pharmacists), public 
accountants, and attorneys. Section 302 includes 
restaurants classified by the number of tables, but does not 
list cooks or waiters. 
 
The fees for section 302 licenses range from $10 for a 
temporary barber to $2,000 for business management or 
consulting firms representing 100 or more foreign service 
corporations. As a catchall, section 302(b) provides that 
"[a]ny person or association engaged in a business, 
occupation, profession, or trade" not listed "or not covered 
by any other provision of this Code shall obtain an annual 
license at a fee of $100." 
 
Despite the majority's view to the contrary, the statute, 
on its face, applies to every person who receives 
compensation from an "occupation" as well as to those 
individuals who engage in a business, profession, or trade. 
The only exemptions are those specified in section 306 for 
governmental, religious, charitable, benevolent, and 
educational organizations. 
 
Despite the broad language in sections 301 and 302, the 
government does not contend that the licensing statute was 
intended to cover such an all encompassing swath of the 
working population. Indeed, the government disclaims such 
an expansive interpretation. The simple language 
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construction adopted by the majority, therefore, has been 
rejected by the licensing body itself. 
 
From the record, it appears that the government has not 
enforced the wording of the catchall clause, rather it has 
pursued a policy of licensing business entities instead of 
their employees. For example, the Territorial Court 
observed that, in a prior proceeding, an official of the 
Consumer Service Administration (entrusted with 
enforcement of the statute) testified that although travel 
agents are listed in section 302, they "are not required to be 
licensed, unless they possess an ownership interest in the 
business for which they work, because they are not 
professionals, but merely employees." Smith v. Magras, Civ. 
No. 167/1993, 1993 WL 566406 at *5 (Terr. Ct. V.I. Dec. 
17, 1993). 
 
The statute itself, in sections 301(b) and (c), requires that 
an application for a license be made on a form furnished by 
the Commissioner of Licensing and Consumer Affairs. 
Applicants must provide information about their personal 
history, experience, business record, and criminal record. 
In designating who should submit applications, section 
301(b) states that "[i]n the case of corporations or 
partnerships the preceding requirements" apply to "all of 
the shareholders or partners." In all cases,"such 
requirements shall be applicable to the actual owners and 
not merely to the nominal owners." Id. 
 
Significantly, employees of corporations and partnerships 
are not listed among those who must submit information. 
Thus, in the case of a corporation, as the statute reads, a 
shareholder must submit personal data, but the president, 
who is merely an employee, need not. Similarly, as 
to partnerships, the statute makes no mention of 
"employee." Subsection 301(c), however, provides that a 
corporation or partnership application "shall designate each 
member, officer, or employee who will exercise the powers 
to be conferred by the license upon such partnership or 
corporation." This subsection does not in any way require 
an employee to apply for a license. 
 
Although the Commissioner now takes the position that 
all lawyers in private practice must pay the license because 
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it is personal to them, that principle has not been 
consistently applied. As the district court noted, in the 
past, the Commissioner had not required an attorney to 
pay a licensing fee "unless the attorney had an ownership 
interest in the law partnership or corporation by which she 
was employed." Magras v. Smith, 940 F. Supp. 124, 129 
(D.V.I. 1996). 
 
To adopt the Commissioner's current position that a 
license is personal would mean that an automobile 
mechanic who is employed by a repair shop (which must be 
licensed under section 302(a)) must also obtain a license for 
his occupation or trade under section 302(b). Similarly, a 
carpenter employed by a large construction firm would have 
to obtain an individual license, as would a clerk in a retail 
establishment. That, however, is not what the 
Commissioner's practice is, or has been. 
 
The Commissioner's litigation posture in an earlier case 
in this Court is revealing. Section 306 exempts "agencies of 
the Virgin Islands or of the United States Government, [ ] 
religious, charitable, benevolent, or educational 
associations." Significantly, that section does not mention 
"employees" of such institutions. However, in Hollar v. 
Government of the Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163, 171 (3d 
Cir. 1988), the government argued that because they are 
merely employees of various agencies, government 
attorneys fall under the blanket exclusion. 
 
Additionally, the Commissioner contended that 
government attorneys were only employees because their 
pre-determined salaries did not depend on the attorneys' 
caseload or success rate. See Smith, 1993 WL 566406 at *4 
(discussing the Commissioner's arguments in Hollar). That 
latter comment, of course, is irrelevant and, in any event, 
may well be said of an associate attorney employed by a law 
firm. 
 
To be consistent, the Commissioner's position that an 
attorney working for a government salary is an employee 
and, as such, not subject to the tax, should carry over to 
an employee lawyer of a law firm who similarly should not 
be obligated to obtain a license. The exemption of employee 
lawyers is what the government successfully advanced in 
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Hollar and that status should apply to plaintiffs here as 
well. 
 
The district court's conclusion that the statute should be 
construed to apply only to partners in law firms or sole 
practitioners who have a proprietary interest is, I believe, 
the proper reading. The district court's construction pays 
due fealty to the canon of construing the statute as a 
whole, gives due regard to the government's consistent 
application over the years, and results in a rational 
interpretation of the legislation. I would affirm. 
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APPENDIX 
 
§ 302 Same; business, occupations, professions and 
trades covered; fees 
 
(a) The following annual license fees are made applicable 
to and shall be levied upon all persons and associations 
engaged in the designated businesses, occupations, 
professions and trades in the Virgin Islands of the United 
States: 
 
Additional place of brokers business                   $ 50 
Advertising                                             150 
Air cargo transportation                                500 
Air charter service per plan                            100 
Air conditioning and refrigeration repair shop          125 
Answering service                                        75 
Apartment house A, more than 12 units                   250 
Apartment house B, 9-12 units                           220 
Apartment house C, 5-8 units                            150 
Apartment house D, 4 or less units                      100 
Appliance repair shop                                   100 
Appraiser                                               100 
Armored car service                                     300 
Artist studios                                          100 
Astrology service                                       100 
Attorney                                                500 
Auto cleaning and polishing service                     100 
Automobile towing service                               100 
Automobile undercoating                                 100 
Automotive inspection and diagnostic services           100 
Automobile mechanical road service                      100 
Baby sitting service                                    100 
Baggage, cargo, mail handling                           225 
Bakery                                                  200 
Barber                                                   50 
Barber apprentice                                        25 
Barber shop initial issuance                            150 
Barber shop renewal                                      75 
Barber temporary                                         10 
Battery and ignition repair                             100 
Beach club                                              100 
Beautician apprentice                                    30 
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Beautician temporary                                     10 
Beauty school                                           200 
Beauty shop initial issuance                            150 
Beauty shop renewal                                      75 
Billiard table per table                                 30 
Blasting service                                        150 
Blender, bottler of alcohol beverages                   800 
Boat building and repair                                125 
Boat charter service per boat                           100 
Boat rental                                             100 
Bookkeeping services                                    100 
Bowling alley                                           300 
Bus transportation per bus                               50 
Business and management consultant                      300 
Business courses and related training                   250 
Business Management or Consulting Firm for 
 Foreign Sales Corporations: 
 Firms managing or consulting for less than 5 
 Foreign Sale Corporations                              500 
Firms managing or consulting for at least 5 but 
 less than 100 Foreign Sales Corporations             1,000 
Firms managing or consulting for 100 or 
 more Foreign Sales Corporations                      2,000 
Butchery                                                300 
Cable car sightseeing tours                             125 
Cable splicing and related work                         150 
Cable television and antenna service                    150 
Car leasing                                             100 
Car Rental A-- 0 to 20 vehicles                         200 
Car Rental B-- 21 to 50 vehicles                        300 
Car Rental C-- more than 50 vehicles                    400 
Carpentry contractor                                     75 
Carpet laying and related services                      125 
Catering service                                        100 
Certified public accounting                             300 
Charm school                                            100 
Check room service                                       50 
Claim adjusters                                         150 
Clinical laboratory                                     300 
Club liquor license                                     200 
Cockfighting                                            500 
Coffee shop and ice cream parlor                        100 
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Coin operated car wash                                  100 
Commercial art services                                 100 
Commercial boat, freight or passengers                  100 
Commercial breeding services                            100 
Commercial diver                                        100 
Commercial kennel                                       100 
Commercial laundry                                      200 
Commercial school                                       250 
Commercial warehousing                                  150 
Commodity exchange clearing house                       300 
Common carrier int. telecommunication                   150 
Communication equipment inst. contractor                150 
Communication equipment oper. contractor                150 
Concrete pumping                                        250 
Construction contractor                                 200 
Consultation and related therapy services               125 
Copyright protection service                            100 
Cottage rental                                          100 
Credit bureau and collection agency                     200 
Customs and visa preparations service                   100 
Dance studio                                             50 
Dealer in explosives Public Safety                      500 
Dental laboratory                                       350 
Development and sale of own property                     75 
Discotheque-- same as night club 
Documentation services for vessels steam ship agent     150 
Dog grooming shop                                       100 
Draftsman                                                75 
Driving school                                          200 
Dry cleaning                                            200 
Dry docking services                                    200 
Drywall-- sheetrock installation contractor              75 
Electrical contractor                                   100 
Electronic security consultant                          150 
Employment agency                                       100 
Escort service                                          200 
Exterminating and pest control                          150 
Fiduciary services                                      100 
Fingerprint services                                    100 
Firearms and ammunition-- distributor or 
 wholesaler                                           1,000 
Firearms and ammunition-- retail sales                  550 
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Firearms and ammunition-- gunsmith                      500 
Fire prevention service                                 100 
Fireproofing contractor license                         150 
Florist                                                 150 
Flower conserv. and agricultural nursery                100 
Flying school                                           250 
Foreign Sales Corporation                               100 
Free lance photographer                                 100 
Garage and repair shops                                 200 
Garbage removal                                         100 
Gasoline station                                        250 
General aviation service and maintenance                125 
General manufacturing-- glass                           150 
General manufacturing-- food                            150 
General manufacturing-- tobacco                         150 
General manufacturing-- textile                         150 
General manufacturing-- clothes                         150 
General manufacturing-- public printing                 150 
General manufacturing-- chemical                        150 
General manufacturing-- petroleum                     1,000 
General manufacturing-- rubber                        1,000 
General manufacturing-- leather                         150 
General manufacturing-- metal                           500 
General manufacturing-- fabricated metal                500 
General manufacturing-- machinery                       500 
General manufacturing-- electrical machinery            500 
General manufacturing-- transportation equipment        300 
General manufacturing-- watches                         350 
General manufacturing-- miscellaneous                   300 
Glass tinting contractors                                75 
Golf course                                             150 
Guard dog service                                       100 
Hair removal service                                     75 
Health club or spa                                      300 
Holding company                                         200 
Hotel and guest house A-- over 100 beds                 400 
Hotel and guest house B-- over 40-99 beds               300 
Hotel and guest house C-- 1-39 beds                     200 
Hotelkeeper-- liquor                                    200 
Hypnotism consultant                                    100 
Ice manufacturing                                       250 
Importer of goods for resale                            200 
 
                                28 
Information and data processing services                100 
Installation of equipment                                75 
Installation of fences                                   75 
Installation of fire and burglary alarm systems         200 
Interior decorating                                     100 
Investment advisory service                             200 
Investment brokerage                                    400 
Itinerant vendor license                                 50 
Janitorial service and supply                           150 
Jewelry and watch repair shop                           100 
Judo instructor                                         100 
Karate instructor                                       100 
Kindergarten school                                     200 
Landscaping consultant                                  100 
Landscaping, garden, maintenance service                100 
Laundromat                                              200 
Laundry pickup and delivery service                     100 
Leasing of plants                                       100 
Lie detection service                                   100 
Liquor wholesalers license                              400 
Machine shop                                            100 
Manicurist apprentice                                    10 
Manufacturers of aerated waters                         150 
Manicurist                                               75 
Marine biological supplies                              100 
Marine salvage and Rel undeater service                 150 
Marine surveyor and blastg service                      150 
Marine surveyor and conltant                            150 
Masonry contractor                                       75 
Massage parlor                                          150 
Master electricia                                       100 
Master plumber                                          100 
Media adverting, promotion and production               200 
Medical labatory                                        300 
Messengernd delivery service                            100 
Misc. asement devices                                   150 
Mobilfood service                                       100 
Mobe refreshment stand                                   75 
Meling agency                                           100 
Mortgage banker                                         200 
Mortgage broker                                         400 
Motion picture distribution                             150 
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Motion picture theater                                  500 
Motor vehicle dealer                                    500 
Moving and freight forwarding services                  200 
Music recording and sales business                      200 
Nickelodeon per machine                                  30 
Night club license                                      700 
Nutrition and consulting services                       100 
Oceanographic research and development                  100 
Out patient care facility                               100 
Owners representative coordinator                       100 
Painting contractor                                      75 
Paralegal services                                      100 
Parking lot vehicle                                     100 
Pharmacy                                                300 
Photocopying services                                    75 
Photographic processing or studio                        50 
Piano technician                                        100 
Pin ball and similar machines per machine                50 
Plastering contractor                                    75 
Plumbing contractor                                     100 
Pollution control services                              100 
Poultry farm-- agriculture 
Prime distillers of alcoholic beverages               1,500 
Printing and publishing house                           250 
Private elementary/secondary school                     200 
Production of milk and milk products                    125 
Project coordinator/consultant                           75 
Public accountant                                       120 
Public auctioneer                                       100 
Public dance license                                     25 
Public relations services                               100 
Public title reporter                                   100 
Radio and television repair shop                        100 
Radio advertising, promotion and production             200 
Radio station                                           500 
Real estate broker                                      250 
Real estate salesman                                    200 
Real estate salesman-- temporary                        100 
Real estate-- change business place                      50 
Real estate-- change of associate                        50 
Red cap porter service                                   50 
Rent of real property (other than buildings)            100 
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Rental of equipment                                     100 
Rental of non-residential building                      150 
Rental watersports equipment                            100 
Repair and maintenance of misc. items                   100 
Restaurant A-- Seating capacity 25 or more              200 
Restaurant B-- Seating capacity less than 25            125 
Retail shop and store-- except liquor                   100 
Retailers liquor license                                250 
Riding academy                                           75 
Rooming house                                           100 
Rug and furniture cleaning on location                  100 
Sailing school                                          200 
Sale of prepaid hotel reservation                       125 
Sales and marketing concepts                             50 
Sales finance                                           200 
Salvage and sale of used parts                          100 
Scheduled air service                                   700 
School of ceramics                                      100 
School of language                                      100 
School of music                                         100 
School of philosophy                                    100 
School of underwater photography                        100 
Scooter and/or motorcycle rental                        150 
Scrap metal collection and sales                        100 
Scrap paper collection and sales                        100 
Scrap plastic collection and sales                      100 
Scuba diving school and related services                125 
Secretarial service                                     100 
Security analyzing service                              100 
Septic tank cleaning                                    150 
Sewer cleaning and rodding services                     150 
Sewerage maintenance and operational engineering 
 services                                               150 
Sewing school                                           100 
Sheet metal and iron work shop                          150 
Ship chandler                                           100 
Shoe repair shop                                         75 
Sightseeing and tour operations                         100 
Sign painting                                            75 
Silk screen manufacturing                               150 
Skating rink                                            175 
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Solicitor, sales and commission agent                     75 
Sporting and recreational camp                           100 
Sports instructor                                        100 
Sports promoter                                          150 
Sprinkle system installation contractor                   75 
Steamship and shipping agents                            150 
Stevedoring license                                      100 
Summer school                                            100 
Swimming instruction                                     100 
Swimming pool installation contractor                    150 
Tailoring and alteration service                         100 
Tavernkeeper A-- distilled and fermented spirits         250 
Tavernkeeper B-- fermented spirits only                  150 
Tax consultant                                           100 
Telegraph office                                         350 
Television station                                       600 
Temporary help contracting agency                        100 
Tennis club                                              100 
Theatrical production, except motion picture             100 
Theatrical promoter and booking agent                    150 
Theatrical variety employment service                    150 
Tile setting contractor                                   75 
Tire recapping and retreading service                    100 
Tobacco Retailer                                         100 
Tobacco Wholesaler                                       500 
Transient disco service                                   75 
Transient amusement operator                             500 
Translation services                                     100 
Travel and ticket agent                                  150 
Tree surgery                                             100 
Trucking, transportation and delivery                    100 
Typewriter repair shop                                   100 
Undertaking business                                     500 
Upholstery shop                                          100 
Used car lot                                             100 
Vehicle inspection service                               100 
Vending machine A-- 
 License-- 0 through 5 machines                          100 
Vending machine B-- 
 License-- 6 through 20 machines                         150 
Vending machine C-- 
 License-- 21 through 50 machines                        200 
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Vending machine D-- 
 License-- more than 50 machines                         400 
Vocational training school                               100 
Water skiing school                                      100 
Water supply services                                    150 
Waterproofing contractor                                  75 
Welding services                                         100 
Wholesaler and other than liquor                         250 
Writing school                                           100 
Yacht brokerage service                                  100 
 
(b) Any person or association engaged in a business, 
occupation, profession, or trade not designated in 
subsection (a) of this section or not covered by any other 
provision of this Code shall obtain an annual license at a 
fee of $100. 
 
. . . . 
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